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Introduction
Aseries of events in Xi Jinping’s first term signal an intensification ofthe government’s policy toward religion. The first of these has beena renewed emphasis on united front work, of which religion is an in-
tegral part. In May 2015, Xi Jinping held what may have been the most sig-
nificant united front work conference in three decades. Prior to the
conference, for the first time since 1982, two sub-national leaders (fuguoji
副国级)—Sun Chunlan (a Politburo member) and Wang Zhengwei (a vice-
chairman of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference)—as-
sumed the positions of department head and a deputy position, respectively,
after the former head of the United Front Work Department was purged
during Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. A second, simultaneous sign was that
the name of the conference was changed from the National United Front
Work Conference to the Central United Front Work Conference. Both these
moves indicated that Xi was placing a new emphasis on united front work,
which Mao had praised as one of the three principal magic weapons, along
with armed struggle and party building, in the Communist Party’s revolu-
tionary victory.
The importance of united front work had for a great part of the PRC’s his-
tory been reduced due to its focus on coalition-building, which no longer
fits the political framework, given the political dominance of the Communist
Party. The renewed emphasis and expansion demonstrates Xi’s recognition
of an increasingly complicated and diverse society (Groot 2016) and of the
challenges this pluralism poses to his reign in “a new era” in which China is
“closer, more confident, and more capable than ever before of making the
goal of national rejuvenation a reality.” (1)
In April 2016, Xi Jinping became the first Party Secretary since 2001 to
attend the annual National Religious Work Conference. At that meeting Xi
called for the Party to consolidate its united front with religious communi-
ties and to unite and organise religious believers to strive for his Chinese
Dream. Speaking to an audience of religious work officials, he pronounced
the grand strategy of religious sinicisation laid out in the Central United
Front Work Conference and asked the attendees to confront the issues of
foreign infiltration and religious extremism as well as to meet the challenges
that had arisen from the Internet. (2)
Officials preparing a revision of the “Regulations on Religious Affairs
(2005)” that had begun in 2014 quickly responded to Xi’s instruction. Their
draft was made public in September 2016, and nine months later, in 2017,
the State Council passed the new Regulations, scheduled to take effect in
February 2018. Wang Zuo’an, Director of the State Administration for Reli-
gious Affairs (SARA), emphasised that the revision was under the direct su-
pervision of the Centre and that it aimed to “put in practice the spirit of the
National Religious Work Conference.” (3)
When he took office, Xi Jinping inherited a variety of challenges in the re-
ligious sphere that he perceived to be detrimental to his ruling objectives.
These issues included widespread commercialisation of Buddhism and Tao-
ism; extremism and anti-Chinese (ni zhongguohua 逆中国化) sentiment
among the Muslim minorities and Tibetans; a persisting belief in the Holy
Order among Chinese Catholics; and the proliferation of house churches
among Protestants. The root cause of all these problems, Xi believed, was
what he considered the failure of the religions to accept and become inte-
grated into “fine traditional Chinese culture” (Zhonghua youxiu chuantong
wenhua 中华优秀传统文化). Especially troublesome, in Xi’s view, were Chris-
tianity and Islam, whose followers’ lack of confidence in Chinese culture has
apparently primed them to absorb Western values and extremism. (4)
The term sinicisation (zhongguohua 中国化), officially introduced at the
Central United Front Work Conference in 2015, connotes a state initiative
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to press religions in China to incorporate Chinese characteristics into their
beliefs and practices. Coining this term was a strategic move aimed at solv-
ing the problems noted above. Yet what sinicisation entails is not immedi-
ately clear, although it targets foreign religious influence among Christians
and extremism in Islam and Tibetan Buddhism. (5) As a political task, it has
met with confusion, anxiety, hostility, and indifference across religious com-
munities. For example, one top leader’s call for Taoism to “persist in and
deepen the process of sinicisation” raised eyebrows among Taoists, who re-
garded the instruction as redundant for an indigenous religion. (6) Further,
the drive caused concern about the loss of cultural identity among minori-
ties. Christians feared that the new policy would further reduce their already
shrinking religious space. 
This paper will address the pitfalls associated with the recent attempt of
the Xi regime to alter the various religious practices and beliefs in China. I
draw my evidence from qualitative and observational data, including inter-
views, official documents, government publications as well as those of the
religious associations, newspaper archives, and online texts from internet
forums. I will show that sinicisation as a policy prescription has failed to go
beyond the existing regulatory framework that caused many of the religious
challenges in the first place. Instead, this effort has managed to only increase
the rigidity of the regulatory framework as it extends the scope of bureau-
cratic discretion in dealing with the various sects by publishing these new
“Regulations.” 
I argue that the plan to tamper with religion for political purposes
achieves only selective implementation at best. What has been an increas-
ingly interventionist approach under Xi risks exacerbating bureaucratic
clumsiness in handling religious matters, which in the past served only to
escalate conflicts between the state and components of the religious com-
munity.
The political use of religion and the
selectivity of religious tolerance in China
Over the course of four decades, official discourse directed toward religion
changed from labelling it anachronistic to terming it cultural. (7) This is be-
cause the party-state has come to accept the positive ability of religion to
provide the masses with psychological and social support (Goosaert and
Palmer 2011). Other than its psychological and social aspects, religion has
also served strategic functions for the regime, as best demonstrated by the
Party’s employing the united front as a strategy, an ideology, and an insti-
tution of which religion is an indispensable part (Van Slyke 1967).
Accordingly, the PRC has since its establishment adopted—at least rhetor-
ically—a policy of freedom of religious belief (8) whose purpose has been to
“unite the mass of believers and nonbelievers and enable them to centre
all their will and strength on the common goal of building a modernised,
powerful socialist state.” (9) The political use of religion in the form of a
united front with “the broad masses of the patriotic religious personages”
has also been the organising principle of the party-state’s religious gover-
nance. 
The CCP manages religions via three functionally different institutional
establishments, each deployed at every administrative level of the party-
state: at the centre, these are the United Front Work Department of the
CCP Central Committee, the State Administration for Religious Affairs
(SARA), and the patriotic associations of the five state-sanctioned reli-
gions. The United Front Work Department is in charge of carrying out re-
search on the religious question, assisting the party committee with reli-
gious policy making, communicating with religious leaders, and coordi-
nating between state organs and the patriotic religious associations. SARA
implements religious policies and administers day-to-day religious affairs.
In the party-state dual hierarchy, the head of the Bureau of Religious Af-
fairs (BRA) at each level of the government is appointed from among the
members of the local United Front Work Department. The personnel over-
lap is to ensure party control over religious policy implementation. Gov-
ernment-approved religious leaders at the various lower levels receive
political appointments as members of the local people’s congresses and
local branches of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
Patriotic religious associations, as the bridge between the state and the
separate religious communities they represent, help mobilise their com-
munities to support official policies. Any major change in policy or its im-
plementation must go through this institutional triangle of the United
Front Work Development, the BRA, and patriotic religious associations
(Palmer 2009). (10)
The CCP’s utilitarian approach to its management of religion, and its heavy
reliance on administrative control, have rendered religious tolerance vul-
nerable to leadership change. This has been especially so since the 1989
Tiananmen violence and the subsequent fall of the Communist Bloc, both
of which led the Party to fear religious subversion. This heightened suspicion
of religion prompted a tightening of religious policy in Document 6, issued
in early 1991 under then-Party chief Jiang Zemin with the goal of stabilising
the regime in the immediate aftermath of the 1989 crisis. (11)
Document 6 set back the more permissive approach to religion that had
been established by Document 19 of 1982. That ruling had generally char-
acterised the official treatment in the 1980s. By contrast, Document 6 for-
mally added a requirement that prior government approval be granted in
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5. Wang Zuoan, “行稳致远，久久为功：坚持我国宗教中国化方向” (Xingwen zhiyuan, jiujiu
weigong: jianchi woguo zongjiao zhongguohua fangxiang, Travel steadily to reach far-distant lands,
persevere for success: insisting on the direction of sinicisation of our country), 中国宗教 (Zhong-
guo zongjiao, China Religion) 2016/10: 13-15. 
6. “俞正声会见中国道教协会成立60周年纪念会代表” (Yu Zhengsheng huijian Zhongguo dao-
jiao xiehui chengli 60 zhounian jinianhui daibiao, Yu Zhengsheng met with representatives at the
commemoration for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Taoist Association), The
United Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee Website, 18 July 2017,
http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/ttfl/201707/87e80908ab7b4790821b635c50320b1b.shtml
(accessed on 28 November 2017).
7. Prominent religious figures, notably Zhao Puchu (Chair of the Buddhist Association of China from
1980 until his death in 2000), began to advocate that religion is culture in order to counter the
view of religion as anachronistic, still influential at that time and represented by the Anti-Spiritual
Pollution Campaign in the early 1980s .
8. For an overview of China’s religious freedom policy until the early 2000s, see Leung (2005).
9. Document 19 of 1982 marked the restoration of the policy of religious tolerance that was aban-
doned since the mid-1950s. It reversed the Party’s nearly three decades of anti-religious policy
and allowed religion to grow under government supervision. As a result of the policy liberalisation,
the 1980s saw a strong rebound of religious activities. See “关于我国社会时期宗教问题的基
本观点和基本政策” (Guanyu woguo shehui shiqi zongjiao wenti de jiben guandian he jiben
zhengce, The basic viewpoint and policy on the religious question during our country’s socialist
period), issued by the CPC Central Committee on 31 March 1982, http://www.sara.gov.cn/
zcfg/zc/497.htm (accessed on 4 December 2017). For English translation, see MacInnis (1989),
8-26.
10. As part of the regime’s new plan to restructure the party-state, SARA is to be merged into the
United Front Work Department. This will further secure the Party’s control over religious affairs.
See “中共中央印发‘深化党和国家机构改革方案’” (Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa ‘shenhua dang
he guojia jigou gaige fang’an’, The CCP Central Committee issuing the “Program to Deepen the
Institutional Reform of the Party and the State), Xinhuanet.com, 21 March 2018, http://www.xin-
huanet.com/politics/2018-03/21/c_1122570517.htm (accessed 7 April 2018).
11. State Council and the CPC Central Committee, “关于进一步做好宗教工作若干问题的通知”
(Guanyu jinyibu zuohao zongjiao gongzuo ruogan wenti de tongzhi, Notification regarding some
questions of further implementing religious work), 5 February 1991, http://pkulaw.cn/CLI.2.65793
(accessed on 3 December 2017).
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order for four types of religious activities to proceed. These practices were:
county-level government assent for the erection of any new religious
venue; (12) provincial permission for the acceptance of large foreign dona-
tions; provincial agreement for any foreign visitation; and State Council au-
thorisation for any major religious activities concerning foreign affairs. 
The CCP had previously avoided making any similar pronouncement be-
cause doing so would have violated its constitutionally-grounded principle
of separation between state and religion. Thus, Document 6 became the
first central-level regulation to explicitly declare the government’s power
to administer religious affairs (guanli zongjiao shiwu 管理宗教事务). Most
importantly, the decree extended state oversight over religion by assigning
the task of drawing up religious legislation to the State Council’s Bureau of
Religious Affairs instead of having the National People’s Congress perform
this role. This decision marked a turn to regulation in the Party’s religious
governance from a stance entailing more self-restraint that had been em-
ployed since the 1980s. 
True, the period from the 1990s onwards did see increasing bureaucratic
control via the drafting and implementation of two major administrative
decrees—the “Regulations on the Administration of Religious Venues” in
1994 under Jiang Zemin and the “Regulations on Religious Affairs” in 2005
under Hu Jintao. As will be shown in the remaining paragraphs, Xi Jinping’s
action served to further this trend with his government’s revision of the
2005 Regulations.
Xi came to power greeted by optimism from domestic reformists and
China watchers that he would enforce a reform agenda leading to political
change. Yet his first term saw tightening ideological control and intensified
crackdowns on civil society, completely different from what was expected
and hoped for. (13)
Xi has defied the norm of collective leadership established by the previous
two generations of party leadership and has concentrated power in his own
hands (see Gueorguiev article in this issue). At the 19th National Party
Congress he placed mostly allies while failing to promote a successor in the
Politburo Standing Committee. The Congress unanimously passed the
amendment to the Party’s Constitution to enshrine “Xi Jinping Thought”—
a terminology previously reserved only for Mao—as a guide for the Party
and the Chinese people to “strive for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation.” (14)
This same amendment elevated the “culture of socialism with Chinese
characteristics” to a strategic position. Xi declared that China’s socialist cul-
ture is rooted in the “fine traditional Chinese culture” developed over the
course of the nation’s five-thousand-year history. Confidence in this national
culture, he proclaimed, would bring about the prosperity and eventual re-
juvenation of the Chinese nation. (15) Accordingly, Xi implied that a vigorously
Chinese national culture is indispensable to China’s continuous rise to great
power status. He also has made explicit his ambition for China to provide
an alternative model to the Western one—“the path, the theory, the sys-
tem, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics (…) a new
option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their devel-
opment while preserving their independence.” (16)
The elevation of traditional Chinese culture is to a great extent a response
to the challenges of Western ideas on the cultural front. (17) The notion of
religious sinicisation stems from this strategic thinking; the concept ap-
peared in Xi’s speech at the 19th National Party Congress in the sections on
“consolidating and developing the patriotic united front” and “effectively
safeguarding national security,” as he elaborates below: 
We will fully implement the Party’s basic policy on religious affairs,
uphold the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in ori-
entation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can
adapt themselves to socialist society (…).
We must rigorously protect against and take resolute measures to
combat all acts of infiltration, subversion, and sabotage, as well as
violent and terrorist activities, ethnic separatist activities, and reli-
gious extremist activities. (18)
This passage summarises the drive behind Xi’s program of sinicising reli-
gion—a concern for regime stability and a fear of religious subversion. The
policy is selective as it by nature favours indigenous or indigenised religions
such as Chinese Buddhism, Taoism, and to a lesser degree, Islam. (19) The pres-
ence in China of Christianity, with its historical connections with the West,
is the reason for the initial adoption and formulation of religious sinicisa-
tion.
“Religious ecology” and sinicisation as a
policy prescription under Xi
Thus, the issue of sinicisation was initially an academic response to a
Christian problem. The school of thought that formulated this notion is
known as the “religious ecology school,” which holds that the workings of
the religious landscape in a society are similar to those of an ecological sys-
tem. A normal state is an equilibrium wherein all religions act as checks on
each other by meeting the distinct demands coming from various groups.
Consequently, the dramatic growth of Christianity in China is viewed as a
pathology of an unbalanced religious ecology resulting from the destruction
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12. The rapid growth of temples driven by local economic initiatives led the central leadership to
stipulate provincial permission for any erection of new temples in 1996. Provincial assent has
since applied to all religious sites.
13. “In Xi Jinping’s Crackdown on Civil Society, Even Women’s Rights Activists Aren’t Spared,” South
China Morning Post, 16 March 2016, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/
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uation in China (2016),” Chinese Human Rights Defenders, February 2017, https://www.nchrd.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/02/annual-report.pdf (accessed on 20 November 2017); “Cyber Space,
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Kong Free Press, 18 October 2017, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/10/18/cyberspace-reli-
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14. “Resolution on the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Revised Con-
stitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhuanet.com, 24 October 2017, http://news.xin-
huanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702726.htm (accessed on 20 November 2017).
15. “习近平提出，坚定文化自信，推动社会主义文化繁荣兴盛” (Xi Jinping tichu, jianding wen-
hua zixin, tuidong shehui zhuyi wenhua fanrong xingsheng, Xi Jinping propose to build strong cul-
tural confidence, help socialist culture to flourish), Xinhuanet.com, 18 October 2017,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/18/c_1121820800.htm (accessed on 22
November 2017).
16. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects
and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” op. cit.
17. Xi’s fear of “foreign infiltration” is best illustrated by Document 9 in 2013, which listed the perils
of Western ideas such as constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, neoliberalism,
and media independence, in undermining China’s political system. See “Communiqué on the Cur-
rent State of the Ideological Sphere,” ChinaFile, 8 November 2013, http://www.chinafile.com/doc-
ument-9-chinafile-translation#start (accessed on 23 November 2017).
18. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects
and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” op. cit.
19. The Chinese-speaking, deeply sinicised strand of Islam is a lesser concern to the regime. The chal-
lenges of anti-Chinese trends and extremism are presented as a regional problem, mainly in Xin-
jiang. See Wang Zuoan, “坚持问题导向，明确目标任务，引领中国伊斯兰教健康发展”
(Jianchi wenti daoxiang, mingque mubiao renwu, yinling Zhongguo Yisilanjiao jiankang fazhan,
Insisting on problem-oriented approach, having clear aims, guiding the healthy development of
Chinese Islam), 中国宗教 (Zhongguo zongjiao, China Religion) 2016/12: 11-13. 
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of indigenous religious traditions, including Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism,
and folk religions that occurred in the first few decades of Communist rule
(Wang and Gao 2012). 
Underlying this school of thought is the idea that the Christian faith is
harmful to Chinese cultural traditions. If the trend is allowed to continue,
this school maintains, the eventual dominance of Christianity would not
only pose a national security threat to the country via its foreign nature
but would in addition bring about a further decline of Chinese civilisation.
The policy prescription to what adherents of this school perceive to be a
Christian problem is to revive fine Chinese cultural traditions, including re-
ligious cultures, while pushing for the sinicisation of Christianity (Mou 2009). 
Specifically, the state should incorporate fine Chinese culture into socialism
with Chinese characteristics; advocate Confucianist ethics; (20) and promote
Chinese Buddhism and Taoism, including solving their commercialisation
problem so that these faiths can utilise their traditional cultural advantage
to help construct a healthy religious ecology. One more facet is that the
state should provide legal space for an autonomous revival of folk religions.
To combat the West’s effort to Christianise China, Christianity in China should
be sinicised by reforming its beliefs and practices, especially by eliminating
its proselytism and discarding its teaching that salvation is possible through
Christ alone, a belief viewed as incompatible with pluralistic and harmonious
(duoyuan tonghe 多元通和) Chinese religious traditions. Above all, Chinese
Christians must fulfil their national consciousness as well as their duty as
citizens and as members of a community of shared destiny by rejecting all
Western ideas and influences (Zhang 2011; Mou 2012; Zuo 2017). 
The first conference of this group of thinkers was convened in March 2012
by the Centre for Religious Culture at Peking University and the Centre for
Christian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. That initiative
drew attention from members of the leadership in 2013 in accordance with
Xi Jinping’s dissemination of the grand narrative of his reign, the Chinese
Dream. (21) They became SARA’s newly established “specially appointed ex-
perts” in 2014. (22) In the following years, under official guidance, national
conferences on the sinicisation of Christianity were held, first in concurrence
with the 60th anniversary of the founding of the National Committee of the
Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China in Au-
gust 2014, and then at the commemoration of the 100th birthday of K. H.
Ting, one of the movement’s founders, in September 2015.
The religious ecology school’s view of an unruly Christian phenomenon
fostered by hostile foreign forces taking advantage of weakening indigenous
institutions reflects an anxiety over the loss of ideological and hence social
control on the part of the ruling elite (Li 2010). It is not surprising that one
of Xi’s ideological hallmarks since he assumed power has been his emphasis
on traditional Chinese culture, and his comment on Chinese Buddhism in
his speech at the UNESCO Headquarters in March 2014 was widely seen
as indicating his support for indigenous or indigenised religions:
Buddhism originated in ancient India. After it was introduced into
China, the religion went through an extended period of integrated
development with indigenous Confucianism and Taoism and finally
became Buddhism with Chinese characteristics. (23)
This stance energised Chinese Buddhist and Taoist communities, which
have since been pushed by the authorities to actively promote China’s soft
power by hosting and participating in international religious exchanges and
organisations. (24)
As Chinese Buddhism was being applauded as a model of sinicisation, a
campaign to demolish churches and crosses under a new zoning regula-
tion (25) took place in Zhejiang Province, where China’s largest Christian pop-
ulation resides. The local leader, Xia Baolong, is a Xi Jinping loyalist and had
served as his deputy during Xi’s tenure as Zhejiang’s party secretary. Between
2014 and 2015, an estimated 12,000 to 17,000 crosses were forcefully re-
moved from local churches, many of which were government-sanctioned
churches whose expansion had been tacitly tolerated by the local state from
the 1980s up until this point. 
This destruction process led to a series of violent clashes between the
local state and parishioners. As bearing an official status no longer guaran-
teed tolerance, and as the patriotic religious associations’ repeatedly pleas
through official channels proved futile to stop the violence, the govern-
ment-fostered provincial patriotic Christian associations (the Zhejiang
Protestant Christian Council, the Zhejiang Patriotic Catholic Association,
and the Administrative Commission of the Catholic Church) unprecedent-
edly issued open letters condemning the action and demanding that local
authorities stop the demolition. (26)
Although the violent part of the campaign eventually died down, it was
followed by dozens of arrests and the removal of church leaders, sending
shock waves through both the authorities and the church, neither of
which had expected such a level of confrontation. The events undermined
the Communist Party’s system of religious governance wherein the pa-
triotic religious associations were said to serve as a bridge between the
state and the religious community. Most importantly, this event undercut
the authoritarian regime’s imperative for social control and stability.
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20. For example, benevolence (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 义), propriety (li 礼), wisdom (zhi 智), fidelity
(xin 信), loyalty (zhong 忠), filial piety (xiao 孝), honesty (lian 廉), and integrity (chi 耻).
21. Zhongxin, “2013 国内宗教形势观察” (2013 guonei zongjiao xingshi guancha, Observations of
the domestic religious development in 2013), 中国宗教 (Zhongguo zongjiao, China Religion)
2014/3: 14-16.
22. “国家宗教事务局成立宗教工作专家库” (Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju chengli zongjiao gongzuo
zhuanjia ku, SARA established an expert group on religious work), People.cn, 26 January 2014,
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0126/c1001-24235908.html (accessed on 1 April 2018).
For a complete list of 33 “specially appointed experts,” see SARA website, http://www.sara.gov.cn/
xxgk/zjgztpzjkjs20170904204343165711/index.htm (accessed on 1 April 2018).
23. “Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at UNESCO Headquarters,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Website, 28 March 2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1142560.shtml (accessed on 15
November 2017).
24. Jiang Jianyong, “大力弘扬中华传统文化，发挥道教积极作用” (Dali hongyang zhonghua
chuantong wenhua, fahui Daojiao jiji zuoyong, Promoting Chinese traditional culture with vigor,
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Special feature
In May 2015, sinicisation entered the official discourse when Xi declared
these words at the Central United Front Work Conference regarding his re-
ligious policy: 
To provide active guidance to religions [so they could] adapt to socialist
society, [we] must insist on the direction of sinicisation, must increase
the level of rule of law in religious work, must dialectically consider
the social function of religion, and must attach importance to and de-
velop the impact of religious personages. [We shall] guide religion to
strive for the promotion of economic development, societal harmony,
cultural prosperity, ethnic unity, and unification of the fatherland. (27)
Xi further elaborated on this policy at the National Religious Work Con-
ference held in April 2016:
Providing active guidance to religions [so they could] adapt to so-
cialist society is to guide the mass believers to love the fatherland,
love the people, safeguard the unity of the fatherland, safeguard the
great unity of the Chinese nation, observe and serve the best inter-
ests of the country and the interests of the Chinese nation as a
whole; to uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to
support socialist institutions, to insist on the path of socialism with
Chinese characteristics; to actively practice socialist core values, pro-
mote Chinese culture, make great efforts to integrate religious doc-
trines with Chinese culture; to obey state laws and regulations, to
conscientiously accept state management by law; to engage in re-
form and opening and the construction of socialist modernisation
and contribute to the Chinese Dream to achieve the great rejuvena-
tion of the Chinese nation.
[it is to] support each religion, while maintaining its fundamental be-
liefs, core doctrines, rituals and rites, in thoroughly uncovering their
content in the teachings and canons that are beneficial to societal
harmony, progress, and healthy civilisation; [support them] to inter-
pret the teachings and canons in line with the developmental re-
quirements of contemporary China as well as fine traditional Chinese
culture. (28)
The logic of the religious ecology school was explicit in the policy pro-
nouncement, with its emphasis on traditional Chinese culture. Even folk re-
ligions are now guaranteed a rightful place in the socialist body polity,
despite having been mostly regarded as superstitions in the past. Xi now
saw the value of folk religions in his quest to uphold Communist rule, as his
speech went on to reveal:
Doing a good job with folk religions has great significance for
uniting the masses and advancing social harmony and stability;
for safeguarding both national and public interests and for resist-
ing foreign infiltration; for promoting China’s fine traditional cul-
ture and cultivating good social norms; for maintaining close
contact with overseas Chinese and promoting the unification of
the fatherland. (29)
At the same conference, Xi asked his audience to follow the principle of
political cooperation enshrined in the ideology and practice of the united
front:
To do a good job with and insist on the basic principles of the Party’s
religious work, the key is to think deeply about, understand thor-
oughly, and carry out with precision [the concept of] “guidance (dao
导).” [We must] “guide” with proper methods, “guide” with vigorous-
ness, and “guide” with effectiveness, and hence firmly seize the ini-
tiative of religious work.
(…) Politically, [we] must insist on unity and cooperation; ideologi-
cally, [we] must respect each other. Engage more, have more heart-
to-heart talks, provide more assistance. Convince [people] via
reasoning; move [them] with emotion; attract and unite [them] via
solving [their] practical difficulties. (30)
This development is remarkable in comparison with the National Religious
Work Conference that Jiang Zemin assembled in December 2001. Against
the backdrop of the anti-Falun Gong campaign that began in 1999, incor-
porating folk religions into the national agenda of religious work and hence
providing them with legitimacy would have been unthinkable a decade and
a half before Xi’s time.
Despite Xi Jinping’s emphasis on guidance, unity, and mutual respect, how-
ever, the revision of the “Regulations on Religious Affairs” that followed his
speech seems to have failed to adjust the regulatory framework. Most of
the rules that had been criticised by the religious community for bureau-
cratic overreach in the 2005 Regulations were left intact. Rather, this re-
working simply expanded the scope and intensity of administrative control. 
Regulations on Religious Affairs: Increasing
religious control
The “Regulations on Religious Affairs” was the highest-level government
regulation on the management of religion in China since 2005. It replaced
the 1994 “Regulations on the Administration of Religious Venues,” which
was the first such bureaucratic decree to impose government oversight fol-
lowing the 1991 issuance of Document 6.
Interestingly, although the leadership had all the more reason to fear
for regime survival given the social and political context in the early
1990s, the content of the 1994 Regulations appeared lax and curt (con-
sisting of just 20 articles) when compared to the succeeding decrees.
That earlier set of rules targeted only religious venues and prescribed
mostly general principles. (31) The 2005 Regulations (with its 48 articles),
however, covered the administration of religious organisations,
academies, personnel, leadership, publication, and property. It greatly ex-
tended bureaucratic discretion over religious affairs, making religious or-
ganisations de facto subsidiaries of the state, and was at that time
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regarded as a huge setback to the relaxation of religious control that had
obtained in the 1980s. (32)
After the 1980s, the religious community made great efforts to push for a
specialised law on religion. (33) Advocates believed that although religious free-
dom had been enshrined in the 1982 PRC Constitution, China had yet to de-
velop the kind of democratic institutions for the Constitution to serve as a
protective device. A law on religion would therefore protect rather than restrict
religion, they imagined, by regulating and restraining the agents of the state. (34)
Hopeful observers had thought that Xi’s reign presented a golden chance for
writing a law on religion after the Party’s 18th National Congress pronounced
what appeared at the time to be the regime’s commitment to the rule of law.(35)
But the 77-article 2017 revision fell short of what the religious commu-
nity had hoped for, that is, a law on religion. Moreover, the new Regulations,
taking effect in February 2018, have not only largely preserved but also in-
tensified the extant bureaucratic oversight. The cost of obtaining legality
remains high. The authority to approve the erection of a new religious site
is placed at the provincial level. (36) The Regulations hold that a religious or-
ganisation must earn a stable income and be led by government-sanctioned
clerics. It must first obtain the approval of the local BRA before submitting
its registration request to the Bureau of Civil Affairs, which can reject the
application if there already exists a similar organisation in the same area or
if the organisation is deemed to pose a threat to national security or unity. 
Small congregations simply do not have the resources to go through these
layers of administrative procedures. Many lack professional clerics, not to
mention clerics certified by patriotic religious associations. Getting certified
in some cases is incompatible with the religious group’s fundamental beliefs,
such as in the case of the “underground” Catholic Church (37) and the evan-
gelical house churches, which have refused to affiliate with the state-spon-
sored patriotic churches. Besides, forbidding multiple similar organisations
to be established in one area grants patriotic religious groups a monopoly
to operate legally. These restrictions have driven a large portion of religious
observances outside of government supervision, and the revised Regulations
have failed to alter this dynamic. 
Another example of the revision’s failure to reform the existing regulatory
framework is in the documentation of the clergy. The state has stipulated
that the certification and appointment of all religious personnel must “re-
port for the record” (bei’an 备案) to the county-level Bureau of Religious
Affairs, which can accept or revoke the status of a clergyperson. But the
bei’an authorities of politically sensitive Catholic bishops and living buddhas
(huofo 活佛) in Tibetan Buddhism are SARA and the BRAs at the provincial
level or above, respectively. (38) Thus, the bei’an system has granted the gov-
ernment control over one of the key dimensions of religious affairs and has
been used to remove those who have failed to comply. (39) As patriotic reli-
gious leaders have increasingly become representatives of government in-
terests, they have lost the authority once commanded by their
predecessors. (40) This has crippled one pillar of the party-state’s institutional
triangle of religious governance.
Furthermore, the revision added new provisions that would shrink religious
space. The regime’s wariness of religious subversion is explicit in the newly
added Article 3, which states that the management of religious affairs shall
“uphold the principles of protecting what is legal, prohibiting what is illegal,
suppressing extremism, resisting infiltration, and combating crime.” (41) Sim-
ilarly, Article 4 added a clause stipulating that individuals and organisations
are prohibited from creating conflicts within one religion or between reli-
gious believers and non-believers; from advocating, supporting, or funding
religious extremism; and from using religions to undermine ethnic unity, di-
vide the nation, and engage in terrorist activities. 
Some of the trends that the Regulations are trying to oppose under the cat-
egory of “illegal activities” are the commercialisation of Buddhism and Taoism,
such as “reckless construction” (luanjian 乱建) of temples and outdoor Buddha
statues, temple leasing, publicly traded temple properties, and impersonating
monks to rake in money, as well as expanding unauthorised religious activities
such as participation in non-government organised hajj, setting up house
churches, and proselytising online. “Extremism” and “crime” in the mind of
those who drafted the Regulations are violence that portend Xinjiang and Ti-
betan independence or autonomy. “Infiltration” refers to foreign missionary
work, the alleged purpose of which is to “Westernise” and “divide” China under
the guise of business investment, building hospitals, setting up charities,
tourism, cultural exchange, and study. The term applies also to the prolifera-
tion of underground churches aided by what the regime sees as a deliberate
effort to oppress and divide patriotic religious associations. (42)
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Special feature
The revision also extends censorship to online religious content, and pro-
hibits non-religious organisations, schools, and venues from providing reli-
gious education and from organising citizens to attend overseas religious
activities (Article 41). This prohibition targets religious groups that operate
outside government purview. What is unprecedented about this article is
that the state even intends to restrict individual citizens’ behaviour abroad.
Finally, these rules grant the authorities the power to punish even when no
crimes are committed (Article 68).
Nonetheless, the revision addresses two pressing issues facing the religious
community, particularly Buddhism and Taoism: unclear property ownership
and the consequent lack of legal personhood of religious venues. These prob-
lems have placed these groups in a disadvantageous institutional position.
Because they could not bear civil liabilities, they have had to rely on patri-
otic religious associations or the BRAs to act on their behalf to enter con-
tracts, obtain loans, and appear in court. Such heavy reliance on the
authorities has rendered religious venues, especially temples, vulnerable to
local state abuse. Temples’ social ownership (shehui gongyou 社会公有) and
potential for religious tourism have driven widespread local state-led temple
commodification. (43) The new Regulations are expected to combat this trend
by specifying the religious community’s rights to state- and collective-
owned sites and allowing religious venues to acquire legal personhood—
but only if they first obtain the permission of the local patriotic religious
association. 
New wine in old bottles
To what extent the new Regulations will be implemented has yet to be
seen. But as of late 2017, its guiding principal of sinicisation has already en-
countered bureaucratic inertia. A deputy head of SARA wrote a special ed-
itorial criticising the attitudes expressed in the ruling and the methods it
mandates as well as misperceptions embedded in the decision, perfunctori-
ness in the execution, a lack of comprehensive planning, and little coordi-
nation among the party-state, religious community, and academia. (44)
Accordingly, the policy has yet to make it onto the work agendas of most
localities; in some areas, it has been disseminated simply as a slogan, and
in others the great fanfare surrounding its announcement from the top has
failed utterly to inspire the grassroots. One of the most peculiar applications
was the promotion of traditional tea culture by provincial Christian Councils
and the Committees of Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant
Churches in Shandong and Yunnan. (45)
In general, all groupings at the grassroots level, Taoist, Chinese Buddhist,
and Muslim communities, do not view sinicisation as their issue—Taoism
is indigenous; Buddhism, as a model of religious sinicisation, is indigenised;
and Islam has achieved sinicisation since the Ming dynasty through its in-
corporation of Confucianism. (46) Moreover, as Catholicism and Protestantism
have been restructured, i.e., “sinicised,” via the “self-election and self-ordi-
nation” (zixuan zisheng 自选自圣) of bishops and the Three-Self Patriotic
Movement since the 1950s, the program of sinicisation is viewed by many
as nothing more than a political campaign whose main purpose is to
strengthen religious control. Despite their enthusiasm for cooperation, the
patriotic religious leaders at the national level are baffled and simply do not
know where to begin, due to the lack of human resources available for sini-
cisation. (47)
Above all, sinicisation as a policy lacks clarity; even Xi’s introduction of it
amounted to little more than a collection of slogans. The leadership of the
party-state’s religious work understands it as a complicated, arduous sys-
tematic exercise that will involve the transformation of the religious field,
including its thoughts, practices, infrastructures, and cultures. Thus far, the
program is still in the stage of concept clarification. 
Hence, the Central Institute of Socialism—equivalent to the Central Party
School for non-party members—began training leaders of patriotic religious
associations and religious academies in spring 2017. (48) Each seminar uses
a combination of two or three course modules that cover general topics,
including “Chinese Culture and the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” and
“Religious Policy and Regulations,” as well as specific themes, such as “Chris-
tianity and Cultural Exchange between China and the West,” “Chinese Cul-
ture and Sinicisation of Christianity,” and “A Pluralistic and Unifying Chinese
Nation.” The courses for the Xinjiang group are designed to inspire nation-
alistic sentiment and even include Mandarin lessons and field trips to na-
tional historical and war memorial museums and science and technology
parks. (49)
The main goal of these generally one-to-two-week seminars is to establish
political and cultural consensus among religious leaders regarding the pro-
gram of sinicisation, (50) even though the courses are target specific and cater
to what the regime perceives as the challenges of each religion—commer-
cialisation and weak discipline in Buddhism and Taoism; extremism and anti-
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Chinese sentiment in Islam; and de-sinicisation and politicisation in Catholi-
cism and Protestantism.
In sum, sinicisation is a top-down socio-political engineering project with
the ambition of accounting for local and religious variations. But few un-
derstand what sinicisation really entails—what it means to incorporate fine
Chinese culture, a concept no less confusing, into theologies. Even fewer
have the ability to promote it to the masses of religious followers. Carrying
out the project with the existing regulatory infrastructure would be like de-
manding political gymnastics from a rigid bureaucratic body. 
Conclusion
This paper seeks to place Xi Jinping’s policy of religious sinicisation in the
larger political context and regulatory framework. The Chinese leader is
aware of the historical juncture at which China currently finds itself, and is
pursuing a soft power strategy as manifested in the grand discourse of the
Chinese Dream and the emphasis on Chinese culture. Yet Xi has also shown
a deep anxiety over foreign infiltration, such that his formulation of religious
policy has been driven by concerns for regime survival. 
The problem is that in having to rely on a clumsy and self-serving bureau-
cracy to resuscitate traditional Chinese culture, religious sinicisation, like its
ideological cousin, the Chinese Dream, is anything but inspiring. As a policy
prescription, the resulting Regulations on Religious Affairs (2018) above all
seek to intensify and expand bureaucratic oversight over the religious
sphere. Despite Xi’s propagation of the principle of “guidance” and the rule
of law, the current regime’s religious governance still follows the logic of
control and exclusion. It imposes comprehensive government supervision
over religious observances that the regime deems normal and beneficial,
but in the process sends underground those it sees as undesirable and non-
conforming. Rather than loosening state regulation and allowing for a
greater degree of religious tolerance, or making more religious observances
legible and thus governable, the new Regulations, by expanding the scope
and intensity of bureaucratic oversight, is reinforcing what is already a dys-
functional state regulation of religion.
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http://www.zysy.org.cn/a1/a-XCWU1A7D2AE1D9FA2D1034 (accessed on 3 February 2018); “中
央社院举办西藏藏传佛教经师培训班” (Zhongyangsheyuan juban Xizang zangchuan fojiao
jingshi peixunban, The Central Institute of Socialism held training seminars for Tibetan Buddhist
lamas), zysy.org.cn, 26 October 2017, http://www.zysy.org.cn/a1/a-XCXIEU495EEC3F6A4FC1F7
(accessed on 3 February 2018); “新疆爱国宗教人士研修班在中央社院开班” (Xinjiang aiguo
zongjiao renshi yanxiuban zai zhongyangsheyuan kaiban, Seminars for Xinjiang patriotic religious
personages opened in the Central Institute of Socialism), zysy.org.cn, 27 November 2017,
http://www.zysy.org.cn/a1/a-XCXQ7F9C9A53BFF8C4BB9A (accessed on 3 February 2018). 
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